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ABSTRACT 
 
Regimes are institutions which provide a venue of cooperation for states to 
address issue-specific concerns. Intergovernmental organizations (IGOS) are more 
tangible entities designed to facilitate the implementation of a regime’s objectives. The 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) for example, is 
an IGO tasked to coordinate states in finding solutions related to the specific issue of 
climate change mitigation.  
As a global environmental issue, climate change is strongly associated with 
greenhouse gases (GHG) emanating from fossil fuel extraction/refining, transportation 
sector, electricity and other energy-intensive industries. The UNFCCC is mandated to 
find ways to mitigate the impact of this impending global threat through the cooperation 
of member-states in curbing their own respective GHG emissions.  
However, energy security is imperative in a country’s economic growth and fossil 
fuels have historically played a role in any state’s industrialization. The Philippines for 
example, acknowledges their importance as it undergoes its own economic 
development. It thereby faces a dilemma on how to maintain its economic trajectory 
while committing to reduce its GHG emissions when it ratified the 2015 Paris 
Agreement, a treaty conceived during the UNFCCC’s 21st Conference of the Parties 
(COP21). Using the country’s energy security policy as a case study, this thesis will 
explore to what extent has climate change mitigation regimes such as the UNFCCC, 
have either constrained or encouraged Philippine policymakers in the design and 
diffusion of the country’s energy security policy. Alongside the country’s direct 
compliance to ratify the Paris Agreement, this thesis will also look into the possible role 
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of informal governance (IG) (i.e. unwritten rules, shared expectations and norms) within 
the UNFCCC’s Paris Talks as a practical option to heed to the dictates of climate 
change mitigation regimes. This framework structure present in the Paris Talks (i.e. 
non-binding, lack of penalties for failing to comply), enables the Philippines to utilize IG 
elements which ensures it of: 1) Flexibility in its energy security policy; 2) Lower 
Transaction Costs to commit to the treaty; and 3) Lower Sovereignty Costs attributed to 
the nonbinding nature of the treaty. 
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I. Introduction  
According to the World Bank, the Philippine economy is expected to grow by 
more than 6 percent in the next three years commencing in 2016.1 This translates to an 
increased need for energy to support its burgeoning industries and to be able to sustain 
this trajectory.  The importance of energy security is acknowledged in two official 
government policy documents including: 1) The 2011-2016 National Security Policy 
(NSP) of the National Security Council (NSC) and the 2) Philippine Energy Plan (PEP) 
2012-2030 of the Department of Energy (DOE). Both policies reflect the government’s 
overall vision of having affordable, reliable and sustainable energy sources. Energy 
security will ensure that the consumption needs of its population of 100 million2 will be 
addressed ranging from electricity to transportation usage.3,4 
A significant portion of the energy type used for the above applications is made 
up of conventional fuels or fossil fuels5 which the DOE classifies as coal, oil and gas 
and natural gas.6 Oil is primarily used in the transport sector and minimally for power 
generation while coal has both power and non-power applications.7  In total, 76% of the 
country’s power generation depends on these fossil fuels.8  
                                               
1
 World Bank, Global Economic Prospects (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2016), 102. 
2
 “Philippine Population, 2010,” Philippine Statistics Authority, accessed May 2, 2017, https://psa.gov.ph/. 
3
 National Security Council, National Security Policy 2011-2016: Securing the Gains of Democracy (Philippines: 
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, 2011), 23.  
4
 Department of Energy, Philippine Energy Plan 2012-2030 Executive Summary (Philippines: Department of Energy, 
2012), 3. 
5
 “Conventional Energy,” Environmental Leader, accessed May 15, 2017, 
http://www.environmentalleader.com/category/conventional-energy 
6
 “Fossil Fuels,” Department of Energy, accessed May 2, 2017, http://www.doe.gov.ph/fossil-fuels/.  
7
 Department Of Energy, Major Accomplishments for 2014 (Philippines: Department of Energy, 2014), 1. 
8
 “2016 Philippine Power Statistics,” Department of Energy, accessed May 2, 2017, https://www.doe.gov.ph/2015-
philippine-power-statistic. 
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On a global scale, 80% of global energy consumption come from these fossil-fuel 
based sources which has environmental downsides.9 Burning fossil fuels is responsible 
for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions which drive climate change. The production of 
energy accounts for around two thirds of all GHG produced by human activity.10 Brahim 
argues that in the Philippines’ case, reliance on fossil fuels makes energy insecurity and 
increased CO2 emissions (which comprises the majority share of GHG emissions) the 
major energy-related issues for the Philippines.”11 The country’s then president, 
Benigno Aquino, whose administration created the 2011-2016 NSP and the 2012-2030 
PEP, was aware of the devastating effects of fossil fuel use. Acknowledging this 
concern, his administration approved renewable energy (RE) projects worth P171 billion 
(USD 4.6 billion) during his six year tenure (2010-2016) owing its benefits of lessening 
carbon footprint emanating from energy use.12 
Alongside the development of domestic RE projects, Aquino served as Chairman 
of the Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF), a South-South cooperation of countries that are 
highly vulnerable to a warming planet.13 Working in the shadows of UNFCCC’s 21st 
Conference of Parties (COP21) which brought the 2015 Paris Agreement to fruition, 
Aquino spoke on behalf of countries that bear “a disproportionate amount of the burden 
                                               
9
 Aidan Rhodes, Jim Skea & Matthew Hannon, “The Global Surge in Energy Innovation,” Energies 7 no. 9, (2014): 
5602, doi:10.3390/en7095601 
10
 Bill Gates, “Energy Innovation: Why We Need It and How to Get It,” last modified November 30, 2015 
https://www.gatesnotes.com/~/media/Files/Energy/Energy_Innovation_Nov_30_2015.pdf?la=en,⁠1. 
11
 Sahara Piang Brahim, “Renewable Energy and Energy Security in the Philippines,” Energy Procedia 52, no. Figure 
2 (2014): 481, doi:10.1016/j.egypro.2014.07.101. 
12
 Catherine Pillas, “P171 billion worth of RE projects approved by Aquino administration,” Business Mirror, last 
modified March 11, 2016, http://www.businessmirror.com.ph/p171-billion-worth-of-re-projects-approved-by-aquino-
administration/. 
13
 “About the Climate Vulnerable Forum,” Climate Vulnerable Forum, accessed August 14, 2017, 
https://thecvf.org/web/climate-vulnerable-forum/. 
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when it comes to climate change.”14 According to Yeb Saño, Director of Greenpeace 
Southeast Asia who also served as chairman in the government’s Climate Change 
Commission (CCC) during Aquino’s term, stated that the then-president signed an 
executive order requiring a “sweeping review” of the country’s energy policy, specifically 
on coal energy use, as part of the preparations for the Philippines’ submission to the 
(Paris) Agreement.15 
The above actions of the Aquino administration appear to fully heed to climate 
change mitigation regimes. However, its other energy-related policies appear to 
contravene these same regimes. An example would be the DOE’s announcement that 
new coal-based power plants are expected to be operational in 2020.16 Even Aquino 
himself acknowledged that the country cannot wean itself completely from reliance on 
coal despite the associated environmental hazards.17  
These sentiments were also echoed by Aquino’s successor, Rodrigo Duterte who 
cited that discounting fossil fuels might “stunt” the country’s industrialization efforts. 
Despite his expressed reservations of the Paris Agreement, Duterte has nonetheless 
formally ratified the treaty shortly after being elected in office.18 
The actual actions of the Philippines might tend be inconsistent and vacillating 
towards climate change mitigation regimes. Using its policy of direct compliance and 
favorable informal governance characteristics in international treaties as starting points, 
                                               
14
 Cited in John Nery, “In Paris talks, Aquino spoke for other countries too,” Inquirer.net, last modified December 01, 
2015, http://globalnation.inquirer.net/133055/in-paris-talks-aquino-spoke-for-other-countries-too.  
15
 Interview with the author, February 15, 2017. 
16
 Iris C. Gonzales, “23 New Power Plants to Go Online By 2020,” The Philippine Star, last modified June 15, 2015, 
http://www.philstar.com/business/2015/06/15/1465896/23-new-power-plants-go-online-2020. 
17
 Carlo S. Lorenciana, “PNoy: Philippines Cannot Totally Rid Of Coal-fired Sources,” The Philippine Star, last 
modified January 11, 2016, http://www.philstar.com/cebu-business/2016/01/11/1541445/pnoy-philippines-cannot-
totally-rid-coal-fired-sources. 
18
 Cited in Leila B. Salaverria, “Duterte finally signs Paris Agreement on climate change,” Inquirer.net, last modified 
March 2, 2017, http://globalnation.inquirer.net/153030/duterte-finallly-signs-paris-agrement-climate-change. 
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this research will explore how such regimes could have significantly made an impact on 
the decisions of Philippine policymakers responsible in the country’s energy security 
policy. Utilizing interviews with these policy makers accompanied by document reviews, 
this project seeks to answer the question of: How are provisions in the UNFCCC 
interpreted or understood by Philippine policymakers in the context of 
implementing the country’s energy security policy?  
This thesis is divided into 8 chapters. Chapter I provides an overview of the 
linkage between the Philippines’ economy, energy situation and global climate change 
mitigation commitments. Chapter II discusses methodology used for this research which 
includes the use of qualitative methods and the corresponding data gathering methods 
which utilized interviews and document reviews. Chapter III discusses the theories of 
regimes and their tangible manifestations in the form of Intergovernmental organizations 
(IGOS). This section also discusses the corresponding governance framework structure 
found in each type and argue the tendency of its corresponding elements to overlap in 
either type of IGOS. Chapter IV examines the correlation between energy security and 
climate change mitigation regimes and the tendency of these spheres to be in conflict 
with each other. Taking a cue on the previous chapter, Chapter V is a specific 
discussion of the Philippines’ own current energy situation and climate change 
mitigation policy. Chapter VI discusses the relationship of the Philippines with 
international regimes wherein it provides a glimpse of how international agreements 
influence the direction of the country’s domestic energy policy. Chapter VII discusses 
the findings of the interviews undertaken with Philippine policymakers in the areas of 
energy and climate change mitigation. Chapter VII provides a summary of this thesis 
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alongside the discussion of the limitations of this research, a set of policy 
recommendations and a detailed agenda for future research on this topic. 
The findings of this thesis yielded the fact that energy security for the Philippines 
is given utmost priority over its global climate change mitigation commitments. This 
shows through the acknowledgment that aspects of the IG framework structure of the 
UNFCCC’s Paris Agreement provided the Philippines a window of opportunity to pursue 
its fossil fuel use as part and parcel of its energy security policy. The IG framework 
which includes noncompliance, nonbinding and the absence of penalties, have allowed 
the Philippines to pursue unilateral actions due to the absence of formal repercussions 
following the consequences of its actions. This research has also validated the claim of 
researchers that the elements of IG namely flexibility, lower transaction costs and lower 
sovereignty costs are not restricted to a certain type of IGOS. Such elements on the 
other hand, are also acknowledged as pertinent in the design and diffusion of the 
Philippines’ energy security policy given the uniqueness of the present (and anticipated 
future) circumstances affecting this policy.  
 
II. Methodology  
 This research will use qualitative methods whose two components are further 
discussed below:  
a. The Research Tradition 
 Following the selection of a research design, Hays and Singh state that 
identifying a research tradition creates a solid foundation for one's chosen research 
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design.19 This research will use the research tradition of case study.  An advantage of a 
case study as a tradition is that it offers a distinctive benefit of case description, and 
thus many qualitative studies are case studies.20  
Creswell states that a case study is used “when a researcher seeks to 
understand a phenomenon for which there is no in-depth understanding at that point in 
time.”21 In a qualitative case study, the questions may address a description of the case 
and the themes that emerge from studying it and these questions ideally begin with a 
‘how’ and ‘why’.22,23 
Yin labelled case studies as “‘bounded systems’ where they have boundaries of 
time, place and other delineations.”24 Given the numerous possible delineations of a 
case study, the researcher tends to have multiple sources of data about the processes 
within it and these multiple decisions arise on how the researcher would approach data 
analysis.25  Researchers can then implement an in-depth exploration to describe and 
interpret what is happening in this bounded system.26  
This research fits the classification of a case study tradition for several reasons: 
First, there is no existing literature that explores in-depth on how the role of international 
regimes are interpreted in the implementation of the Philippines’ energy policy at any 
                                               
19
 Danica G. Hays,and Singh, Anneliese, A. Qualitative Inquiry in Clinical and Educational Settings (New York: 
Guilford Press, 2012), 44. 
20
 Ibid., 47. 
21
 John W. Creswell, Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five traditions (Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications, 2006), quoted in Danica G. Hays,and Singh, Anneliese, A. Qualitative Inquiry in Clinical and Educational 
Settings (New York: Guilford Press, 2012), 340. 
22
 John W. Creswell, Research Design:  Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches (Thousand Oaks: 
SAGE Publications, 2013), 185. 
23
 Hays and Singh, Qualitative Inquiry in Clinical and Educational Settings, 44. 
24
 R.K. Yin, Case study research: Design and methods (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2008), quoted in Danica 
G. Hays,and Singh, Anneliese, A. Qualitative Inquiry in Clinical and Educational Settings (New York: Guilford Press, 
2012), 340. 
25
 T.A. Schwandt, Dictionary of Qualitative Inquiry (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2001), quoted in Danica G. 
Hays,and Singh, Anneliese, A. Qualitative Inquiry in Clinical and Educational Settings (New York: Guilford Press, 
2012), 340. 
26
 Vicki L.Plano Clark and Ivankova, Nataliya V., Mixed Methods Research: A Guide to the Field. (Thousand Oaks: 
SAGE Publications, 2016), 146. 
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point in time. Second, the research question begins with a ‘how.’ Third, the research 
itself is bounded given that it will examine within the strictures of its energy security 
policies within the timeframe of the 2012-2030 Philippine Energy Plan (PEP) and 
climate change mitigation obligations centred on the Paris Agreement which are 
themselves confined within certain time periods. Lastly, the study of these policies have 
multiple sources of data led by interviews and document reviews.  These factors provide 
a strong justification to classify my research in the tradition of a case study   
b. Data Collection Methods 
Due to the acknowledged importance of the different perspectives of policymakers 
on how international regimes are interpreted and understood in the context of the 
Philippines’ energy security policy, semi-structured interviews using open-ended 
questions alongside document reviews were used.  
 Gill, Treasure and Chadwick state that semi-structured interviews “consist of 
several key questions that help define the areas to be explored, but also allows the 
interviewer or interviewee to diverge in order to pursue an idea or response in more 
detail.”27 Creswell adds that the questions can become broad and general so that the 
participants can construct the meaning of a situation, typically forged in discussions or 
interactions with other persons and thereby reinforcing the constructivist view of multiple 
participant meanings28 and “the more open-ended the questioning, the better, as the 
researcher listens carefully to what people say or do in their life settings.”29  
                                               
27
 P K Stewart Gill, E Treasure and B Chadwick, “Methods of Data Collection in Qualitative Research: Interviews and 
Focus Groups,” British Dental Journal 204, no. 6 (2008): 291, doi:10.1038/bdj.2008.192.  
28
 Creswell, Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches, 4. 
29
 Ibid., 8. 
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Reiterating the objective of this research in getting the perspective of different 
policymakers on the role of international regimes in the implementation of the 
Philippines’ energy security policy, semi-structured interviews and open-ended 
questions are the most compelling way for these policymakers to express their 
viewpoints in an unfettered manner considering that the research itself seeks answers 
beyond mere ‘yes’ or ‘no’ responses.   
Another significant potential contribution of interviews in general is that it can 
lead to a ‘snowball effect’ following the researcher’s solicitation of participants based on 
referrals from previous participants.30 
 Document reviews on the other hand, provide an ‘official’ written representation 
of the policy being examined. These documents can also provide insight and 
information in understanding the participants’ experiences of a phenomenon.31 Being 
distinct from interviews themselves, official documents can offer a less invasive way to 
collect data especially if the topic itself is deemed sensitive.32 Documents can also be 
used as secondary data collection when an important aspect of a study has been left 
unexamined or not understood without these documents.33 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with past and present policymakers, 
negotiators and advisers from different branches of government, private sectors and the 
academe who have been involved in policy-related work in the country’s energy and 
climate change mitigation sectors during the time of the Aquino and Duterte 
administrations.  These include individuals from the Climate Change Commission 
                                               
30
 Ibid., 431. 
31
 Hays and Singh, 284. 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Ibid., 287. 
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(CCC), the Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources (DENR), National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), and the 
government’s legislative branch. The ‘snowball effect’ was also anticipated to occur in 
the course of these interviews. Given the physical distance of these individuals and the 
researcher, communication through Skype and e-mail correspondence were primarily 
utilized.  
 A total of six (6) interviews were made lasting from 30-100 minutes. Interviews 
via Skype were shortly transcribed and manually coded alongside policy documents. 
Coding involved assigning categories for similar keywords or statements falling well 
within the context of the assigned category. Categories included the components that 
fall within the framework structure of IG such as noncompliance and nonbinding. A 
category for the elements of IG have also been created which includes flexibility, lower 
transaction costs and lower sovereignty costs (see Table 1). 
 Domestic policy documents that were reviewed include the DOE’s 2012-2030 
PEP, the NSA’s 2011-2016 NSP, CCC’s 2011-2028 National Climate Change Action 
Plan (NCCAP), NEDA’s Socio Economic Report 2015 and Philippine Development Plan 
2017-2022. Press releases and statements found in both local and international media 
were also included. For its policies related to Paris Agreement, this thesis will review the 
country’s Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) submission to the treaty 
and the UNFCCC’s “Paris Agreement” itself. 
 
 
III. International Regimes and Their Governance Structures 
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Regimes in the context of international relations are defined as “sets of implicit or 
explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge.”34 Regimes are considered social institutions which govern the 
actions of states involved in specific sets of activities and, like such institutions, they 
showcase the accepted patterns of behavior or practice.35 Keohane argues that one 
major function of an international regime is to “facilitate the making of specific 
agreements on matters of substantive significance within the issue-area covered by the 
regime.”36 This in turn leads to the creation of consistent expectation among 
governments which would have been otherwise difficult or impossible to attain if 
regimes did not exist.37 
O’Neill adds that “the process in general of regime creation and strengthening 
over time helps create and spread shared norms of acceptable behavior among states, 
consensus over the significance and definition of  a given problem, and knowledge 
about a given problem and its solutions.”38 In turn, “the practice of participating in 
regimes may come to change state preferences and identities themselves and the act of 
cooperation over time works to “socialize” states towards a more cooperative 
international system.”39  
Puchala and Hopkins’ rigid classification of regimes can serve as a starting point 
to identify major differences between regimes. Regimes are classified into two kinds: 1) 
                                               
34
 Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” in 
International Regimes, edited by Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 2. 
35
 Oran R. Young, “Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes,” in International Regimes, edited 
by Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 93.  
36
 Robert Keohane, “The Demand for International Regimes,” in International Regimes, edited by Stephen D. Krasner 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 150. 
37
 Ibid. 
38
 Kate O'Neill, The Environment and International Relations, 76. 
39
 Ibid. 
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“Formal” regimes are characterized as “legislated by international organizations, 
maintained by councils, congresses or other bodies and monitored by international 
bureaucracies.”40 2) “Informal” regimes on the other hand “are created and maintained 
by convergence or consensus in objectives among participants, enforced by mutual 
self-interest and “gentlemen’s agreements” and monitored by mutual surveillance.”41  
In more tangible terms, issue areas of regimes are addressed through different 
Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOS) wherein these IGOS can be utilized by states 
in varying degrees depending on their outlook and interests of the issue at hand. 
These IGOS have the same elements found in the classification of regimes by 
Puchala and Hopkins. Vabulas and Snidal show similar characteristics between Formal 
Intergovernmental Organizations (FIGOS) and Informal Intergovernmental 
Organizations (IIGOS) vis-a-vis formal and informal regimes respectively. While the two 
authors are known for their work on IIGOS, defining and setting conditions what makes 
them as such, involved identifying the substantial characteristics of FIGOS at the outset.  
The authors adopted the classification of FIGOS from Pevehouse et al. wherein the 
latter identified the following characteristics present in such organization namely: (1) 
That it is a formal entity; (2) has states as members; and (3) possesses a permanent 
secretariat or other indication of institutionalization such as headquarters and/or 
permanent staff.42  
IIGOS on the other hand, have the following opposite characteristics than that of 
FIGOS which include: (1) an explicitly shared expectation—rather than a formalized 
                                               
40
 Donald J. Puchala and Raymond F. Hopkins, “International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive Analysis,” in 
International Regimes, edited by Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 65. 
41
 Ibid. 
42
Jon Pevehouse, Timothy Nordstrom, and Kevin Warnke. "The Correlates of War 2 International Governmental 
Organizations Data Version 2.0." Conflict Management and Peace Science 21, no. 2 (2004): 103. 
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agreement—about purpose, (2) with explicitly associated state members who (3) 
participate in regular meetings but have no independent secretariat or other significant 
institutional support such as a headquarters and/or permanent staff.43 
States have varying reasons to choose a FIGO over an IIGO or vice-versa as 
they see fit. Vabulas and Snidal identified trade-off elements found in either IGO which 
are summarized using the table below: 
Table 3-1: The Trade-offs In Institutional Formality44 
Informal IGO offers… Formal IGO offers... 
Greater flexibility  Binding commitment 
Greater state autonomy  Stronger collective oversight 
Closer control of information Collective control of information 
Low short-term transaction costs; speed 
in new arrangements 
Low long-term transaction costs for on-
going implementation 
Minimal bureaucracy; low cost Centralized capacity; stability 
Management during high uncertainty 
(crisis) 
Management during routine problems  
 
Based on the classification between formal/informal regimes and FIGOs/IIGOS 
by Puchala and Hopkins and Vabulas and Snidal respectively, the trade-offs in either 
groups offer a clue on the type of governance elements that are present in each group. 
However, while this strict classification between FIGOS and IIGOS enables the 
researcher to identify corresponding types of governance, this classification is not black 
                                               
43
 Felicity Vabulas and Duncan Snidal. "Organization without Delegation: Informal Intergovernmental Organizations 
(IIGOs) and the Spectrum of Intergovernmental Arrangements." The Review of International Organizations 8, no. 2 
(2013): 197. 
44
 Ibid., 211. 
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and white. Randall Stone’s research would suggest that the corresponding governance 
structures are neither permanently hinged on either FIGO or IIGO.  
Stone’s study suggests a more flexible approach to IGOS and can be considered 
a continuum rather than a binary distinction between FIGOS and IIGOS. Citing several 
studies done on both formal and informal regimes (as manifested in the form of FIGOS 
and IIGOS), Stone stressed that “a number of anomalies have emerged that challenge 
the paradigm of explaining outcomes in terms of formal-legal treaty provisions, and 
scholars working in diverse areas have converged on an appreciation of the significance 
of informal governance (IG) in international organizations.”45 This includes the tendency 
of FIGOS to operate to some degree of variance with their formal rules which include 
standard operating procedures, voting rules, organizational chains of command, written 
policies.46 These in turn, provide stable and predictable policy outputs.47  
Westerwinter shares Stone’s definition of informal governance as “unwritten 
rules, shared expectations, and norms that are not enshrined in formally constituted 
organizations and which modify or substitute legally binding rules.”48 Westerwinter 
expounds on the implications of this definition by providing an example based on his 
own study. He says that while policies are negotiated within the formal governance 
architecture of an organization, “these policies have no binding force and seek to affect 
the behavior of their addresses through coordination, harmonization and sharing of best 
                                               
45
 Randall W. Stone, "Informal Governance in International Organizations: Introduction to the Special Issue," The 
Review of International Organizations 8, no. 2 (2013): 122, doi: 10.1007/s11558-013-9168-y. 
46
 Ibid., 125. 
47
 Ibid. 
48
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practices” to which effectively “combine formalized decision-making procedures with 
informal ones - i.e. voluntary outcomes.”49 
Stone and Westerwinter’s definition and identification of characteristics pertaining 
to informal governance shares similar characteristics to that of IIGOS as identified by 
Vabulas and Snidal. For one, the attractiveness of controlling the outcomes of a given 
situation is more conducive to informal over formal arrangements.  Stone further agrees 
with the argument of Vabulas and Snidal that states prefer informality in situations 
“when they value rapid decision making and confidentiality more than efficient 
implementation and consistency.”50 Westerwinter, on the other hand, also adds that  the 
attractiveness of informality are due to its speed and flexibility of which it can be 
“negotiated and adapted” given the unpredictability of the state of the world.51  
Global uncertainties significantly affects countries’ attitudes towards 
environmental regimes including climate change mitigation regimes. As a consequence, 
compliance to treaties become direct challenges to states. O’Neill states that while 
states may want to comply with an agreement, they may find themselves unable to do 
which could be attributed to a state’s lack of:  1) political will; 2) capacity or ability to 
comply; and/or 3) inadvertent non-compliance.52   She further adds that “both will and 
capacity may wax and wane over time, as governments change hands, or country’s 
economic conditions change.”53 As such, several studies on regime compliance 
examined how measures such as sanctions, incentives and the scope and fit of regime 
                                               
49
 Ibid. 
50
 Randall W. Stone, Informal Governance in International Organizations: Introduction to the Special Issue, 127. 
51
 Oliver Westerwinter, The Politics of Informal Governance, 10. 
52
 O'Neill, The Environment and International Relations, 115. 
53
 Ibid. 
 15 
 
obligations contribute to state’s will and capacity to comply with treaty obligations over 
time.54 
The capacity of states to comply with climate change mitigation regimes varies 
given their respective capabilities. This is further acknowledged in the Paris Agreement 
itself where states are given considerable latitude. While the treaty stated that “parties 
shall pursue domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving the objectives of 
such contributions,”55 it also stipulated that the agreement “will be implemented to 
reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.”56 
In the case of the Philippines’ energy security policy which faces the trilemma of 
security, affordability, and sustainability while ratifying the Paris Agreement at the same 
time, already presents a tug of war scenario. It would then further limit its ability to fully 
comply if it were imposed sanctions brought by strict and binding commitments.  
However, as the recognition of the country’s capabilities to comply to this 
international treaty comes to light, the flexibility factor that informal governance offers 
ensures that the country’s energy security policy can still conform to the provisions of 
climate change mitigation regimes. Flexibility, at the same time, reflects the reality of the 
country’s own reservations towards legally binding treaty compliance. IG also effectively 
brings an almost guaranteed retention of state autonomy and lower transaction costs 
(i.e. costs of committing to the treaty). Possible elements of IG found in the UNFCCC as 
it relates to the country’s energy security policy, will be further examined. 
                                               
54
 Ibid. 
55
United Nations/Framework Convention on Climate Change, 21st Conference of the Parties, Paris Agreement, 
(2015),p. 3, available from 
http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf. 
56
 Ibid. 
 16 
 
 
IV. Energy Security and Climate Change Mitigation Regimes 
Asif and Muneer define energy security as the consistent availability of sufficient 
energy in various forms at affordable prices and that any economy is dependent on 
secure supplies of energy.57 Rhodes et al add that “ready access to cheap, abundant 
energy supplies is essential for the smooth operation and competitiveness of any 
modern economy.”58 Doriana, Franssen and Simbeck state that governments enhance 
their own country’s energy security by ensuring a reliable supply of energy resources at 
reasonable prices to support their own domestic economies and industries.”59  
Historically, modern states have relied on fossil fuels to address their energy 
security needs. This has been in place for nearly two centuries and was only preceded 
by the wood-burning and deforestation era of the 1600s-1800s.60 To date, the world 
heavily relies on fossil fuels to meet its energy requirements providing almost 80% of 
the global energy demand.61 Rhodes et al emphasized that “transportation, heating, 
light and the electronic systems which drive modern economies all depend on global 
energy supplies of which are largely fossil-fuel based.”62  
 Fossil fuels, like any other resources, are also finite and as such, presents critical 
challenges to policies centered on energy security itself. Rhodes et al suggested that 
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such challenge lies in striking a balance within the trilemma of energy security, 
affordability, and management of its environmental impacts.63  
RE technologies such as solar, wind and hydro have made headway in recent 
years to address the above trilemma and is even considered to be either at par or 
cheaper than fossil fuels.64 However, the “lock in” factor to prevailing fossil fuels-based 
technologies have retained a foothold in the last two centuries. This development further 
prevents newer technologies from fully taking over the status quo. Gallagher et al argue 
that even economically viable new technologies typically face higher short-term 
adoption costs compared to established technologies. This is attributed to several 
factors including the involvement of an extended period of trial and errors, further 
corrective adjustments and the establishment of an industrial base for these newer 
technologies to become capable of competing with existing ones on a pure cost basis.65 
Byrne et al further argue that high-carbon technologies, fuels and practices are 
often deeply entrenched in existing energy systems. These systems can include 
powerful vested interests thereby making “the politics of change far from being 
straightforward.”66 The authors further added that “developing low-carbon energy 
systems is not only a case of supporting new technologies but also a means of 
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dismantling and replacing old high-carbon technologies, and challenging the institutions, 
interests, market structures and social norms that go with them.”67 
 However, the continued acceptance of fossil fuels as the global status quo has 
been causing adverse implications on the ecosystem and inflicting enormous impacts 
on the environment including climate change.68 Holdren states that “global climate 
change is increasingly recognized as both the most dangerous and the most intractable 
of all of energy’s environmental impacts.”69 
Developing nations who rely on fossil fuels for their burgeoning economies are 
aware of these concerns. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), to 
which the Philippines is one of its 10 member states, acknowledges that 2015 and 
beyond marks a critical point for global energy markets as “countries around the world 
address challenges related to burgeoning energy consumption, and security of energy 
supply in a sustainable manner to address the environmental effects.”70 ASEAN further 
states that such a crucial time should be directed to “improve policy frameworks for 
encouraging responsible energy consumption, higher efficiency, and international 
standards for emissions, while supporting the growth of energy markets and ensuring 
security of supply.”71 
To address these concerns on emissions reduction brought by energy use and 
mitigate its adverse effects on the environment, the provisions of climate change 
mitigation regimes are being carried out by several IGOS such as the UNFCCC through 
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its COP21 mechanism that facilitated the 2015 Paris Talks. As part of a state's’ 
intentions to adhere to this specific treaty, Intended Nationally Determined Contributions 
(INDCs) are submitted. These INDCs are the nationally determined pledges which may 
vary in scope but will contain, implicitly or explicitly, commitments relating to the energy 
sector and serve as the foundation of COP21.72  
 
V. Philippines’ Current Energy Situation 
The Philippines’ energy security policy as reflected in the 2012-2030 PEP shares 
the same global trilemma concern as identified by Rhodes et al. To address this 
concern, the DOE states that “the energy sector, mindful of its role in promoting better 
quality of life for the Filipino people, will ensure the delivery of secure, sustainable, 
sufficient, affordable and environment-friendly energy to all economic sectors.”73  
An independent study done by a local policy institute in the Philippines stated 
that “Philippine economic growth is expected to become inextricably linked to the growth 
of the energy sector.”74 The country, however has only modest indigenous energy 
resources75 alongside low volume production capabilities for conventional fuels.76 As 
such, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) classified the country as a net 
energy importer.77 
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To offset these deficiencies, it relies on imports which accounts for more than 
40% of the country’s energy needs. Oil and coal constitute majority of its imports (See 
Table 2).  
 
Table 5-1: Philippines Energy Sources for 2013 (Source: DOE)78  
Imported Oil 28.91% 
Imported Coal 13.91% 
Imported Biofuels 0.42% 
Indigenous Energy 
 
56.75% 
 
Broken down into: 
Oil: 1.55% 
Natural Gas: 6.42% 
Coal: 8.32% 
Hydro: 5.54% 
Geothermal: 18.36% 
Biomass: 16.20% 
Solar/Wind: 0.01% 
Biofuels: 0.36% 
 
 
 
According to the APEC’s Energy Demand and Supply Outlook, fossil fuels will 
continue to dominate the country’s total power generation wherein “coal thermal alone is 
expected to provide almost 70% of its electricity generation by 2035, followed by natural 
gas with a 16% share.”79 It will also grow the fastest at an average annual rate of 6.5% 
during this period and by the end of 2025, coal is likely to exceed oil in the primary 
energy supply, mainly as a result of coal use for electricity generation.80 Oil, on the other 
hand, “will continue to dominate the economy’s energy mix from 2010–2025, accounting 
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for one- third of its total primary energy supply.”81 This is mostly attributed to the growth 
of the transport sector during that period which will consume more than 60% of the 
economy’s total oil supply.  
In its own outlook scenario encapsulated in the 2012-2030 PEP, the DOE 
acknowledged that “oil will still be the major fuel accounting for an average share of 
43.5 percent of the total energy demand.”82  
Amidst these scenarios where fossil fuels will play a major role in the country’s 
energy security, the Philippines nonetheless, is aware of its climate change mitigation 
obligations. The PEP, which “contains the policies, plans and programs that will 
significantly contribute to the country’s transition towards a low carbon economy – an 
economy that generates minimal output of GHG emissions into the biosphere” 
acknowledges that the Philippines is “cognizant of the fact that the energy sector is the 
biggest contributor of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, accounting for about 49.0 
percent of the country’s total emissions.”83  
In its Climate Change Vulnerability Index (CCVI), Global risk and strategic 
consulting firm Maplecroft Verisk ranked the Philippines sixth in the most vulnerable 
countries to the effects of climate change in the next 30 years.84 The Philippines being 
an archipelagic state, is ranked highest in the world in terms of vulnerability to tropical 
cyclone occurrence and third in terms of people exposed to such seasonal events.85  
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The acknowledgment of this vulnerability prompted the Philippines to formulate 
its framework strategies and actions towards climate change adaptation and 
mitigation.86 Despite contributing a minimal amount of GHGs globally (see table 3), the 
country puts greater emphasis on adaptation as necessary to complement measures 
that reduce GHG emissions which acts as a “mechanism to manage risks, adjust 
economic activity to reduce vulnerability and to improve business certainty.”87 
 
Table 5-2: Carbon Dioxide (C02)* Emission Contribution in Million Tonnes (MT)  
1990-201488 
Contributors Total C02 Emission  Share to Total (%) Annual Average Growth 
Rate (%) 
Philippines 1,740 0.26% 3.81% 
Global 670,656 100% 2% 
*C02 is attributed to the majority of GHGs emissions at 76% followed by methane (16%) 
nitrous oxide (6%) and fluorinated gases (2%). 
 
The country’s economic planning body, National Economic and Development 
Authority (NEDA), through its Philippine Development Plan 2017-2022, underscores the 
need to “balance between the rates, service reliability, and the environmental 
implications of the different technologies utilized” in the country’s energy sector.89 It 
further added that “too much intermittent renewable energy affects grid reliability, but 
reliance on cheaper fuels, such as coal, increases greenhouse gas emissions.”90 The 
NEDA further recommended that “an optimal energy mix is needed to provide maximum 
benefits at the most reasonable costs to consumers while safeguarding the sector from 
external shocks.”91 
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VI. International Regimes and Philippines’ Domestic Policies 
a. Historical Involvement  
The Philippines has a history of participation in IGOS encompassing multiple 
issue areas. This can be traced even before the formation of the United Nations (UN) 
when the country was one of the early signatories of the UN Declaration in 1942 which 
forms the basis of the UN Charter.92 On a regional level, it was one of the founding 
member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Albeit a regional 
organization, ASEAN has strong attachments to the UN as reflected in the 
organization’s aims of promoting “regional peace and stability through abiding respect 
for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region and 
adherence to the principles of the UN Charter.”93  
In the issue area of global climate change mitigation, the Philippines has held 
both formal and informal leadership positions in the UNFCCC since its inception. Yeb 
Saño of Greenpeace Southeast Asia and former government negotiator on climate 
change issues, stated that formal leadership roles included chairing roles in different 
committees and different work streams. These roles include positions in the Berlin 
Mandate, the Kyoto Protocol, the Bali Action Plan, the Paris Agreement process in 2011 
and through the eventual adoption of the 2015 Paris Talks.94 Informal leadership roles 
on the other hand, occurred during the negotiations themselves wherein the Philippines 
took up the cause of vulnerable countries and served as a bridge between other 
developing countries and negotiating partners. According to Saño, the country’s 
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leadership roles enabled it to become a “further a credible voice in these negotiations.”95 
Its leadership roles however, should not be construed as having a direct impact on the 
outcome of such negotiations, specifically the 2015 Paris Agreement itself. 
b. Direct Compliance 
Cortell and Davis argue that an international rule enjoys the greatest degree of 
domestic salience when the state “has made concrete alterations in its policy choices, 
or has incorporated formal procedures into its domestic processes in an effort to be in 
accordance with the rule’s prescriptions.”96 The Philippines’ own domestic policies and 
laws have incorporated the edicts of international regimes. In his inaugural address, 
President Aquino stated that the Philippines is ready to take its place “as a reliable 
member of the community of nations, a nation serious about its commitments and which 
harmonizes its national interests with its international responsibilities.”97 
 The adherence of the Philippines to the provisions of climate mitigation regimes 
manifested itself through changes to its own various domestic policies. Examples 
include: the DOE’s own PEP wherein its framework reflects the country’s desire to 
participate in climate change mitigation through its “responsiveness to long-term global 
policy frameworks on energy such as the UN Sustainable Energy for All Initiative, the 
ASEAN Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation (APAEC) 2010-2015 and the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) Green Growth Goals.”98 Another example is the 
country’s National Framework Strategy on Climate Change which “takes into 
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consideration and complies with the commitments of the Philippines in multilateral 
environmental treaties, specifically the UNFCCC.”99 Saño claims that even before the 
UNFCCC’s inception in 1992, the country’s then-president established an inter-agency 
committee on climate change in anticipation of its adoption and was one of its first 
signatories.100 Several existing policy instruments contain various specific 
contributions in the country’s pursuit of climate-resilient strategies. Jonas Leones, 
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) stated that in the 
area of energy, the Renewable Energy Act (Republic Act 9513) included the creation of 
a renewable energy trust fund, incentives for RE developers, increase in RE-based 
capacity and no subsidies on coal and other fossil fuels.101 The Biofuels Act (Republic 
Act 9367) mandates the use of biofuels for transport wherein beginning in 2008, 5% 
bioethanol was mixed with gasoline which was further increased by 10% in 2010. For 
diesel fuel, 1% blend Biodiesel was required by 2006 and was further increased to 2% 
by 2008. The Environmentally Sustainable Transport (Administrative Order 254) 
mandated the country’s transportation department to lead in formulating a national 
environmentally sustainable transport (EST) for the Philippines.102 This policy included 
reducing emissions, cleaner fuels, low pollution and low carbon mass transportation 
system.103 Leones also stated that an overall energy fuel mix policy towards cleaner and 
                                               
99
 Climate Change Commission. National Framework Strategy on Climate Change 2010-2022 (Manila: Office of the 
President, 2010), 7. 
100
 Interview with the author, February 15, 2017. 
101
 Interview with the author, February 25, 2017. 
102
 Office of the President, Administrative Order No. 254, s. 2009 (Manila, Office of the President, 2009), 1. 
103
 Ibid. 
 26 
 
more efficient fuels and technologies for power generation is being reviewed in the 
hopes that it will be applied to the transportation sector as well.104 
 In its own INDC submission, the Philippines utilized “internationally accepted 
tools and methodologies” to help it identify possible mitigation options. This includes the 
2006 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) guidelines for the GHG 
inventory alongside the utilization of the organization’s software as one of the 
measurement tools.105  
As if to galvanize its commitment in combating climate change, the country 
submitted its INDC ahead of the COP21106, which eventually culminated in the 
ratification of the Paris Agreement by the country’s president, Rodrigo Duterte.  
 
c. Informal Governance and Flexibility  
O’Neill previously indicated that states can exhibit apprehension in complying 
with environmental agreements considering that global uncertainties persist which can 
lead states to change their priorities. States therefore seek a degree of flexibility that 
can be found in the framework structure of IG present in FIGOs. The UNFCCC, despite 
having the characteristics that make up a FIGO, is still an attractive option for ratification 
of its 2015 Paris Talks by states who are in the process of undergoing domestic policy 
changes. Its nonbinding nature in effect, assures states that there is an option to defect. 
These options are available from the outset wherein the Paris Agreement 
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acknowledged that states have different circumstances which are guided by the 
Convention’s “principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.”107 Should a state 
decide to defect, the Agreement states that “at any time after three years from the date 
on which this Agreement has entered into force for a Party, that Party may withdraw 
from this Agreement by giving written notification to the Depositary.”108  
While the Philippines has formally ratified the Paris Agreement signifying its 
desire to contribute its share in climate change mitigation, unpredictabilities have 
emerged connected to its growing economy which induced the country to increase its 
dependence on fossil fuels. The informalities brought by the nonbinding nature of the 
Paris Agreement ensures that flexible options exist which can be utilized by the 
Philippines as it addresses its domestic energy challenges. At the same time, it is 
assured that it will be relieved of any significant pressure imposed by climate change 
mitigation regimes to curtail its GHG emissions.  Based on interviews with the country’s 
energy policy makers, the IG framework of the Paris Agreement effectively 
acknowledges the need for flexibility. This mainly revolves around the issue areas of: 
continuous revision/tweaking of its energy policy, market forces involved in the country’s 
energy distribution, capacity of fossil fuel use to address its own energy trilemma and 
uncertainty of foreign assistance to assist the country’s climate change mitigation 
capacity. It also ensures that the Philippines undergoes low transaction and sovereignty 
costs for ratifying the Paris Agreement altogether. 
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VII. Findings 
The Paris Agreement recognizes that to significantly reduce the risks and 
impacts of climate change, the global community should strive to maintain the global 
average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursue efforts to 
limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.109 The Philippines 
has aspired to do its part to meet these targets, citing its intention to reduce GHG 
emissions by up to 70% by 2030, relative to its Business as Usual (BAU) scenario of 
2000-2030 wherein “reduction of CO2 emissions will come from energy, transport, 
waste, forestry and industry sectors.”110 However, attaining this is contingent “on the 
extent of financial resources, including technology development & transfer, and capacity 
building, that will be made available to the Philippines.”111 In relation to the country’s 
energy sector, technical inputs and assistance are considered critical for “grid efficiency 
improvement, standard development for energy and water efficiency, cost-effective 
renewable energy, alternative or high-efficiency technology for conventional power 
generation, among others.”112 
In its INDC, the Philippines indicated that it wants to address the challenge of 
pursuing economic development while simultaneously having to deal with the impacts of 
climate change and natural hazards.113 However, the eagerness to solve two conflicting 
and extreme scenarios presents the impossible likelihood of achieving both at once and 
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necessitates the achievement of some balance between the country's energy security 
policy and its global climate change mitigation obligations.  
As indicated on Table 1, Vabulas and Snidal identified the different degrees of 
institutional formalities found in both FIGOS and IIGOS. The authors rigidly classified 
formal and informal elements as belonging to FIGOS and IIGOS respectively. However, 
as Stone and Westerwinter argue, such rigidity is an anomaly since based on their own 
studies, informal governance exists in FIGOS as well. The UNFCCC, albeit a FIGO 
itself, has created an IG framework through its Paris Agreement.  Based on the 
interviews conducted with energy and climate change mitigation policy makers of the 
Philippines, key IG elements that have been identified are as follows: 1) Flexibility, 2) 
Lower Transaction Costs and; 3) Lower Sovereignty Costs.  
 
a. Flexibility 
According to Koremenos et al, “flexibility is particularly desirable when states do not 
want to make strong commitments because of high uncertainty about future states of 
the world, severe distribution problems that cannot be fully anticipated, or when states 
do not need or want higher precision.”114 Vabulas and Snidal adds that states would 
prefer an institutional arrangement that binds them less strictly as it gives them “greater 
leeway to adjust to unanticipated outcomes as circumstances evolve.”115 
                                               
114
 Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., & Snidal, D. The Rational Design Of International Institutions,  
International Organization 55, no. 4 (2001) and Abbott, K., & Snidal, D. “Why States Act Through Formal International 
Organizations.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42 no. 1 (1998) quoted in Felicity Vabulas and Duncan Snidal. 
"Organization without Delegation: Informal Intergovernmental Organizations (IIGOs) and the Spectrum of 
Intergovernmental Arrangements." The Review of International Organizations 8, no. 2 (2013): 210. 
115
 Felicity Vabulas and Duncan Snidal, “Informal Intergovernmental Organizations (IIGOs),” (presentation, APSA 
Annual Meeting, Seattle, WA, August 2011), 29. 
 30 
 
Accomplishing the Philippines’ international commitments is contingent on having 
a greater leeway to make essential adjustments to its own domestic policies. These 
needed modifications are attributed to several circumstances surrounding the overall 
energy situation of the country:   
a.1) Continuous Revision/ ‘Tweaking’ of the Country’s Energy Policies 
Philippines policymakers have acknowledged that the country’s energy security 
policy is not static and that it needs to change as reflected on the changing 
circumstances that the country undergoes. This perceived necessity effectively affects 
its intended commitments to international arrangements as well. Carmencita Bariso, an 
official from the Department of Energy, stated that the PEP is “being updated from time 
to time as the administration sees the need to adjust the plan.”116  This is hinged to the 
fact that the constitution limits the term of the country’s executive branch to 6 years in 
office.117 Dave Yu, a policy adviser for the Philippine Legislative Branch, admitted that 
each incoming president assigns a different energy secretary who may have different 
ideas regarding the country’s energy policy.118  Current Philippine president Duterte 
emphasized that in his administration, he `will not micromanage` government agencies 
and will limit any intervention to `make recommendations` or if `there is trouble that 
comes up.’119 Duterte’s appointed energy secretary on the other hand, vows to prioritize 
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the continuity of energy programs of the previous administration by securing reliable 
power for the country in general.120 
Bariso points out that while the country`s president and assigned cabinet 
secretaries come and go, the country’s energy policy nonetheless transcends political 
boundaries “because energy projects take time and are long gestating projects.”121 
While approved power projects are being constructed, the PEP is being updated 
annually and that every change involves continuous consultations of the energy 
department’s directors with their nationwide constituents including Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) and environmental groups as part of the agency’s “bottom up” 
approach.122 
Legislative policy advisor Dave Yu, acknowledges that continuous tweaking is 
cognizant of the “inflexibility of the law” which “gives the executive branch enough room 
to maneuver and handle unforeseen developments in the field which makes the 
country’s energy policy product of constant ‘tweaking’ and evaluation of what works and 
what doesn’t.”123 
The DENR’s Leones, acknowledges that the country’s submitted INDC is still in 
the “process of revision” and that if the Philippines is to achieve the global call of the 
COP21 for a 1.5°C limit on global temperature increase, the Paris agreement must have 
a “rulebook that is equitable, balanced, and cohesive, and elaborated through a process 
that is inclusive, transparent and efficient.”124 Reflecting on the country’s INDC as 
subject to revision, it further stated that based on fair share, it will “commence a broad 
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consultative process to determine the propriety of the need to peak its emissions taking 
into consideration the country’s economic growth and development. This in turn, can 
help facilitate the country’s transition into a clean energy-driven economy.”125  
The INDC’s provisions to undertake its objectives reflects the flexibility 
characteristics which are enshrined in the Paris Agreement as well. One of the primary 
objectives of the agreement is guided by “the principle of equity and common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national 
circumstances.”126 The agreement also recognizes the individual situations of 
developing countries such as the Philippines as having special needs given its 
vulnerability to the adverse effects of climate change.127  
The Agreement also acknowledges the need for certain countries to peak 
emissions as part of the process to “undertake rapid reductions thereafter in accordance 
with the best available science.”  At the same time the Agreement admitted that peaking 
“will take longer for developing country Parties” which effectively favors the Philippines 
given its current status as a developing country.128  The agreement encourages 
developing country parties to continue enhancing their mitigation efforts and encouraged 
to move over time towards economy-wide emission reduction or limitation targets. 
However, the Agreement recognizes that these are to be done “in light of different 
national circumstances.”129 
While the Paris agreement has a transparency framework which includes 
progress tracking and monitoring of adaptation actions based on submitted INDCs, the 
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agreement nonetheless includes a “built-in flexibility.” This stems from the 
acknowledgment of each country’s varying mitigation capacities and that further 
flexibility is given to developing country Parties “that need it in light of their 
capacities.”130  
a.2) Market Forces Working Against RE  
Distribution of Philippine energy is market-based. The Electric Power Industry 
Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) effectively led to the deregulation of the country’s power 
sector. It also enabled the sector to wean itself from a “regulation-based and inefficient 
industry to a market-based and efficient one.”131 However, this market-based policy 
presents challenges to the country’s domestic energy policy to be in sync with climate 
change mitigation agreements since the private sector and the accompanying market 
forces determine energy development (i.e. control of electricity distribution and 
construction of power plants). According to former climate change negotiator Yeb Saño, 
the 2001 EPIRA basically allows market forces to determine the country’s energy 
development.132 He further adds that “what the government can only do is monitor and 
forecast demand and has very little say in what kind of technology is used in the 
construction of any power plant. As such, the governance structure in the electricity 
sector poses big challenges for the country’s energy policy makers.”133 
Gilbert Olfiña, an Economic Development Specialist at the government-run 
National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), states that the construction of new 
coal-fired power plants is not a deliberate policy of the government but as a result of 
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having a market-based sector and the country’s lack of a mandatory fuel mix policy.  
Olfiña then adds that “any company that applies for a permit or a certificate is allowed as 
long as they meet the (minimum) necessary environmental or technical 
requirements.”134 The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) further clarified that the country’s 
“current government policy and decision making prioritizes providing energy at least 
cost, with exclusion of cost of externalities (i.e. health and environmental costs).”135  
Another climate change adviser recognizes the “inherent advantages” of coal 
over RE under the country’s current pricing regime that does not have any existing 
carbon tax to cover externalities thereby “the lowest cost power supply option will 
always be favored.”136  The adviser further added that “fossil-fuel plants are secure 
investments providing continuous revenue streams, since the proponents could avail 
themselves of automatic pass-through of their fuel costs to consumers” while “RE 
projects are considered to be high risk investments as the resources fluctuate widely 
from year to year.”137  
Costs of building power-generating plants are also at play here. Legislative policy 
advisor Dave Yu argues that coal power plants require a low initial investment cost 
compared to other technologies, particularly RE which has high initial investment 
costs.138 While the country’s Renewable Energy Act of 2008 was mandated to 
accelerate the “exploration and development of renewable energy sources,”139 RE 
investors nonetheless still face barriers which lead to the increase in upfront costs.  
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According to a study done by the Asian and Pacific Centre for Transfer of Technology, 
the lack of local technical knowledge on the implementation of RE technologies (RETs) 
makes renewable energy projects to be considered as “very uncertain, whether they are 
economically practicable or not.”140 This in turn, “causes investors to be very careful in 
financing RE activities in the Philippines.141 The study further adds that this “same lack 
of knowledge in RETs also extends to the financial institutions, which may provide loans 
to RE developers, but the inadequacy of appropriate funding poses a hindrance to RE 
promotion and utilization.”142 
The lack of local technical know-how on REs makes the country dependent on 
imported technology. Despite the good intention of REs, dependence on imported 
technology and lack of “sufficient experience in its development and operations” 
alongisde consequent reliance on foreign contractors makes RE project costs higher in 
the country compared to Europe and the U.S.143 
In another study done by the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), 
administrative barriers can also make a financial impact on the overall costs of RE 
projects in the country. It stated that “administrative costs indirectly affect soft cost 
components such as capital costs and profit. High administrative costs indicate risks, 
which reduce the predictability and cost security of the renewable energy project. 
Financing institutions thus usually demand a risk premium, which will raise capital 
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costs.”144 The IRENA study also added that while “local commercial banks are 
recognising the business potential of RE and are becoming more open to lending to RE 
projects, the high risk perception associated with renewables means lending terms for 
renewable energy projects are still conservative, especially for new renewable energy 
players still establishing their financial track record.”145 
Financing institutions on the other hand, “are very familiar with coal plant 
development, and power companies are well-versed in their construction and 
operations” as opposed to RE projects, therefore funding for conventional fossil-fuel 
plants are easily accessible as opposed to RE projects.146 
Given the barriers faced by REs in the country, NEDA’s economic specialist 
Olfiña states that sources that are able to address the baseload requirements is 
fundamentally the government’s priority to address the country’s energy security which 
coal-fired power plants are able to efficiently provide.147 Legislative policy advisor Yu 
also argues that as the Philippines’ grid is suffering from very low reserves, the 
“intermittency of renewable options coupled with the maintenance requirements of the 
power plants result in an absence of reliable baseload options. Thus, as the current 
system lacks viable base load options, fossil fuel plants, particularly coal, continue to be 
attractive to meet baseload options.”148 
a.3) Uncertainty in the Delivery of Foreign Assistance  
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Based on the country’s ratification of the Paris Agreement, the Philippines is a 
willing partner in climate change mitigation.  However, to be able to meet its targets, it 
needs foreign assistance to do so. Such condition requires a degree of flexibility on the 
Philippines’ end as failing to receive the assistance the country needs effectively 
prevents it from undertaking its necessary climate change mitigation goals.  
As explicitly stated in its INDC, “financial resources, technology transfer and 
capacity building support for adaptation will ensure that the country’s committed 
mitigation INDC will be attained.”149 Full implementation of its INDC requires “support in 
the form of adequate, predictable and sustainable financing” and that external 
assistance is required to enable the development and adoption of the most appropriate 
technologies to improve adaptive capacities and resilience.150  
Yu contends that the country’s commitment “is based on the availability of fund 
transfers from developed countries but there are now significant questions regarding the 
availability of these said funds as donor countries have struggled to pledge the amount 
that is needed to finance the program.”151   
Anticipation of the absence of external assistance is effectively accommodated in 
the Paris Agreement itself.  The acknowledgment that countries have different 
capacities necessitate different accommodations to meet their respective targets. This 
couldn’t be more fitting to the situation of the Philippines itself where foreign assistance 
is necessary to meet its climate change mitigation targets. The absence of this 
guarantee that capable countries will not renege on their pledges necessitates that the 
Agreement provides flexibility to anticipate such emerging contingencies.   
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 a.4) Capacity to address the energy trilemma 
Achieving energy security involves balancing the disparate elements of the 
energy trilemma, which once again refers to security/reliability, affordability and 
sustainability. While RE could significantly bridge these gaps, the DOE acknowledges 
that “even with the dawning of renewable energy development, it recognizes the fact 
that the country will remain dependent on conventional fuels for many years to come to 
address its growing energy requirements.”152 
Antonio La Viña, government negotiator to the COP21, stated that energy 
options have been laid on the table including various technologies including RE to find 
ways to find a balance in addressing this trilemma.153 NEDA’s Olfiña on the other hand, 
stated that the government places importance in addressing first the country’s baseload 
demand to ensure that there is sufficient supply of energy which these (fossil fuel) 
plants provide for that objective at the moment.154 Fossil fuels are also a necessity 
owing to the fact that the country came from a critical period of having insufficient supply 
of electricity. Olfiña further indicated that “anything (type of plant) that comes in, as long 
as it meets the requirements (i.e. environmental), it is accepted by the government.”155   
The DOE also echoes NEDA’s sentiments further stating that there are 
technologies now that can clean up coal while being able to maintain a 70% base load 
capacity.156 The energy agency also indicated that while it does not discount the role of 
RE in the energy mix, it might not be the total answer to the country’s energy security.157 
As such, the country needed options prompting the present administration’s adoption of 
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a “technology neutral policy” in which all options of energy,  for the purpose of building 
up the economy “will be taken into consideration but with due consideration on the 
environment as well.”158  
  
b. Lower Transaction costs 
Transaction costs are defined as the general costs involved when making a 
deal.159  Weimer et al., point out that when “transaction” is used as a unit of analysis, it 
can apply to varying scenarios including “the execution of a contract specifying a 
sequence of actions to complete a series of related exchanges over a long period of 
time.”160  These contracts can range from formal (i.e. legal documents) to informal (i.e. 
norms and other customary practices).161  
Fulfilling environmental commitments can place a burden on a state, which 
makes informal agreements easier to abide by. As indicated by O’Neal and 
Westerwinter, binding commitments can be hard for states to abide by given the 
uncertainty of the state of the world. Vabulas and Snidal further maintain that “informal 
arrangements can be concluded more quickly and with lower negotiation (i.e. 
transaction) costs because the commitments are less binding and permanent.”162 
 In the course of the “execution” of the Paris Agreement, signatory states are not 
penalized should any of them fail in their emission reduction targets.  It is in the absence 
of such penalties that lower transaction costs emerge which serve as a form of incentive 
for states to adhere to this commitment. In the process of adhering, as O’Neill argues, 
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the overall participation of states in regimes enables them to be socialized in a more 
cooperative international system.163  
Given that the commitment by the Philippines to the Paris Agreement is 
contingent on several conditions including the acknowledgment of the unpredictability of 
the future, IG elements found in the Agreement makes it convenient to pursue its 
energy agenda thereby incurring lesser transaction costs of committing to such global 
obligation. As legislate adviser Yu has explicitly stated: “It should be noted that the 
pledge of the Philippines is not an ironclad commitment as far as the country is 
concerned, as there is no noted penalty if the Philippines fail to honor its 
commitment.”164 Former climate change negotiator Yeb Saño, stated that despite the 
ratification of the Paris Agreement which also serves as an opportunity for the country to 
“pursue coherence between energy security and addressing climate change globally,” 
there is nothing that can bind the Philippines to limiting its energy sources despite the 
cognizance of climate change as an important issue.165  
The very nature of the Paris Agreement is by itself a voluntary arrangement. It 
allows parties to “choose to pursue voluntary cooperation in the implementation of their 
nationally determined contributions to allow for higher ambition in their mitigation and 
adaptation actions.”166 The agreement also allows a member of the Party to withdraw 
from the Agreement at any time after three years the Party has entered it into force.167 
 The Paris Agreement’s nonbinding nature, absence of penalties for failing to 
meet expected emission reduction targets and the open provision of allowing states to 
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withdraw from the agreement altogether provide lower transaction costs for abiding by 
the treaty. In the case of the Philippines, lower transaction costs enable the country to 
have a freehand in making the necessary adjustments to its energy policy. This has 
never been emphasized in the Duterte administration’s adoption of a technology-neutral 
policy which allows it to pursue its fossil fuel use agenda without fear of any penalties. 
The lesser costs involved in committing to a non-binding international treaty can further 
incentivize states to execute such contracts since in effect, there is really nothing to lose 
for ratifying it as it enables these states to become, in the words of O’Neal “socialized 
towards a more cooperative international system.” 
 
 
c. Lower Sovereignty Costs 
Another benefit of having an IG as part of a FIGO framework structure is that it 
enables states to retain their independence and “sacrifice less autonomy when they 
choose informal arrangements.” 168 This contrasts to the appeal of adhering to binding 
legal arrangements where Abbott and Snidal argue that accepting such obligation 
especially when it entails delegating authority to a supranational body, would be costly 
to states.”169 The authors stated three conditions wherein sovereignty costs could 
impact a state’s attitudes towards regimes if their sovereignty would be affected: First, 
sovereignty costs can be relatively low when states simply make international legal 
commitments that limit their behavior in particular circumstances and accepting these 
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costs enable them to achieve better collective outcomes.170 Second, greater sovereignty 
costs emerge when states accept external authority over significant decisions when 
international agreements insert (implicitly or explicitly) international actors (who are 
neither elected nor subject to domestic scrutiny) into a country’s national decision 
procedures.171 Third, sovereignty costs are at their highest when “international 
arrangements impinge on the relations between a state and its citizens or territory.”172 
The potential threat of high sovereignty costs on states drive them to select 
arrangements that are “non-binding or imprecise or do not delegate extensive powers. 
Most often, states protect themselves by adopting less precise rules and weaker legal 
institutions.”173 
 The Paris Agreement explicitly states that the Convention’s transparency 
framework aside from “recognizing the special circumstances of the least developed 
countries and small island developing States,” its own transparency arrangements will 
be “implemented in a facilitative, non-intrusive, non-punitive manner, respectful of 
national sovereignty, and avoid placing undue burden on Parties.”174 
 The Philippines is mindful of its own sovereignty during the negotiations leading 
to the Paris Agreement and that it is also aware that the UNFCCC respects its individual 
decisions. Former climate change negotiator Saño says that the UNFCCC never gave 
advice regarding sovereign decisions on using specific energy sources. This is due to 
the fact that the UNFCCC also “embodies the right of sovereign nations and sovereignty 
is a very important principle of the UN and therefore any advice on a country’s national 
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energy policies is deemed as a disrespect of sovereignty.”175  Kat Coballes of the 
NEDA’s Environment Division, also agrees stating that the UNFCCC gives the country 
its own executory right and that it doesn’t prescribe a particular domestic regulation or 
policy.176 Dave Yu of the legislative branch stated that the “UNFCCC recognizes the 
independence of states and their sovereign rights in deciding how to achieve their 
energy security and climate change goals” and that it did not raise any issue regarding 
the Philippine’s planned capacity mix.177 The DENR, the lead agency for the country’s 
delegation in the COP21, stated that its engagement with the UNFCCC mainly dealt 
with the preparation and submission of the country’s National Communication which is 
an obligation by the Philippines government to the Convention.178 Alongside this, the 
UNFCCC Secretariat also assisted the Philippines with the “enabling activities 
necessary to undertake an improved national greenhouse gas (GHG) inventory, to plan 
for actions for the mitigation of climate change and adaptation to its potential impacts of 
climate change.”179 
 The nonbinding nature of the Paris Agreement enables the Philippines to 
undertake lower sovereignty costs as it further pursues its domestic fossil fuel use vis-a-
vis its climate change mitigation commitments. Such arrangements gives it assurance 
that its energy trilemma will be addressed in the quickest way possible while at the 
same time being assured of the absence of pressures from global commitments. 
VIII. Discussion  
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Given the continuous changes that countries of the world undergo, global binding 
commitments make it difficult for states to abide by. This is no more prominent than in 
the area of environmental protection such as climate change mitigation. While states 
would openly express their desires to contribute their share of curtailing their respective 
carbon emissions, they are nonetheless encumbered by their domestic priorities. These 
include the need to continually utilize fossil fuels in order to support their 
industrialization efforts despite the universally accepted fact that utilizing such fuel type 
exacerbates the negative effects of climate change. 
In the case of the Philippines, the need to continue using fossil fuels is at the 
forefront of its energy security policy as it enters a period of industrialization. However, 
this presents a dilemma as it also ratified the Paris Agreement, which effectively 
expressed its desire to be part of the global community doing its share to protect the 
environment. While contradicting as it may appear, the framework structure of IG in the 
Paris Agreement ensures that while the Philippines chose to comply to this treaty, it still 
has considerable leeway to proceed with a fossil-fuel based energy security policy. This 
in turn, enables it to find a balance to address its domestic trilemma of security, 
affordability and environmental sustainability.  
IG elements found in the UNFCCC Paris Agreement effectively enables the 
country to attain: 1) Flexibility in its energy security policy, 2) Lower Transaction Costs 
to commit to the treaty and 3) Lower Sovereignty Costs attributed to the nonbinding 
nature of the treaty. 
Flexibility ensures that the Philippines has a “maneuvering room” to pursue its 
energy security policy. Continuous “tweaking” has been acknowledged as necessary 
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since several factors come into play here. These include changes in the elected officials 
holding office, continuous consultation with stakeholders including environmental 
groups and the general anticipation of unforeseen developments that the country 
continually faces especially as it undergoes a period of economic growth.  
The role of market forces also plays a significant role in the need for flexibility. 
While REs as a viable clean energy source and have made significant strides in the 
country’s energy scene, it nonetheless still faces enormous challenges. This is due to 
the fact that the RE industry, being a new player in the country, faces financing 
challenges compared to well-established fossil fuel energy players who have already 
set an indelible mark decades ahead of their RE competitors. This makes RE 
investments, in the eyes of financial institutions, “riskier” compared to its counterparts. 
The dependence of the RE industry on foreign contractors further downplays its 
competitiveness owing to the lack of experience in the development of its own domestic 
development and operations. Given these circumstances, conventional fuel sources, 
due to their “tried and tested” reputation to meet base load demands and easier funding 
access compared to REs, provide a “bang for the buck” investment which is conducive 
in a deregulated energy market such as the Philippines.  
 Commitment by the country to the Paris Agreement necessitates the provision of 
foreign assistance for it to be able to meet its targets to the global cause of climate 
change mitigation. However, as David Yu of the legislative branch contends, this pledge 
might not come to fruition at all.180 It is therefore incumbent for the Philippines to have a 
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slew of options to be able to get out of a possible conundrum should this pledge gets 
reneged by the country’s expected benefactors.  
The IG framework structure in the Paris Agreement assures the country of having 
lower transaction costs in making international commitments. Commitment to a 
nonbinding treaty translates to low transaction costs. Given its voluntary nature, the 
absence of stringent penalties in the treaty anticipates the possible shortcomings of 
member-states to meet their emissions reduction targets. Joining a treaty with lower 
transaction costs can be an incentive for states to sign up. For the Philippines, given its 
historical involvement in the United Nations as a whole, it would further reinforce its 
standing in the “brotherhood of nations” as a policy adviser puts it, without the caveats 
of legal repercussions if it fails to meet its it emissions targets or decide to withdraw 
altogether from the treaty if it chooses to, down the road. 
The flexibility in the Paris Agreement provides the Philippines with a level of 
security and comfort to address its domestic energy trilemma while at the same time 
allowing it to keep up with its international commitments on climate change mitigation at 
its own pace while keeping international pressures at bay. This flexibility is managed 
and kept in bounds by the member states through the parts that contribute to the 
framework structure of IG as identified in this thesis. 
The researcher fully acknowledges certain limitations of this research. Given that 
the number of individuals willing to be interviewed is limited to 6 policymakers divided 
across the issue areas of energy security and global climate change mitigation, their 
participation may not be enough representation for the conclusion used in this research. 
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It is thereby strongly suggested to proceed with caution when drawing conclusions 
given the small number of interviewees.  
Nonetheless, these 6 interviewees, who belong to the limited number of 
participants willing to share their viewpoints, cover key perspectives across all sectors 
affecting energy security vis-à-vis environmental protection. These include the 
executive and legislative branches of the Philippine government, the NGOs and 
academe who regularly participate in the government’s ‘consultative process’ with the 
public on its domestic policies. Interviewees from these two specific entities have also 
played significant roles in the preparation and eventual ratification of the Paris 
Agreement.  
The limited number of individuals willing to participate is not the only barrier 
faced by the researcher. Certain pertinent government agencies and departments who 
played significant roles in either the country’s energy security policy or climate change 
mitigation negotiations that would have otherwise contributed immensely to this 
undertaking, have declined to be interviewed. Their contributions could have added a 
different layer of perspective from the rest of the participants.  
The use of qualitative methods also has its limitations. As participants’ 
perspectives are given more emphasis, this research acknowledges the fact that their 
subjective experiences form the crux of this research. It is also acknowledged that any 
individual being interviewed about his role in a certain occupation especially those who 
dedicated their professional lives to, will not self-deprecate nor undervalue their 
contributions or the role they played. Policymakers therefore, are no exception. 
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There are several policy recommendations that can be suggested following the 
findings of this research. First, domestic energy security trumps over the Philippines’ 
obligations to the global cause of climate change mitigation. As such, the country 
should stay on course of its priority unless it wants to risk its economic growth which 
would be preposterous to think of given that the evolution of the now-industrialized 
countries started in the same path. 
Second, since the IG framework structure of the Paris Agreement comprises 
nonbinding and lack of penalties if a state fails to meet its emission targets, the 
Philippines is placed in a favourable position to pursue further its fossil fuel use. It 
therefore needs to take advantage of such framework to be able to further address its 
domestic energy needs. 
 Third, the Paris Agreement’s IG framework structure coupled with the 
Philippines’ actual miniscule global carbon footprint (see Table 3) places it in a 
surreptitious advantage wherein it can still aggressively pursue its fossil fuel use while 
at the same time avoiding being accused as a major carbon emitter in the world stage. 
Before the country gets “blamed” for its GHG emissions, much larger emitting countries 
such as China, India and the United States would be criticized first. 
Fourth, while IGs’ framework structure remains in place in the Paris Agreement 
and implies that the Philippines can aggressively pursue its fossil fuel use, it also gives 
it ample time to improve the policies surrounding its RE sector to become more 
competitive in a deregulated domestic energy market. 
Fifth, the Philippines needs to aggressively pursue RETs as it leads to the 
reduction of its reliance on fossil fuels. While it acknowledges that fossil fuels will be 
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part and parcel of its energy composition in the years to come, aggressive pursuit of 
RETs can make it one of the eco-friendly ‘model countries.’ This can give a signal to the 
rest of the world that it is aggressively pursuing ways to wean itself off fossil fuels. As 
an economically growing country, albeit susceptible to climate change, it needs to 
convince other countries to cooperate on the increased reliance on RETs to curtail the 
harmful effects of climate change.   
 There has been no existing study of how climate change mitigation regimes 
impact the design and diffusion of the Philippines’ energy security policy especially 
within country’s changing economic landscape. Albeit this research is timely given the 
mentioned circumstances, it would be interesting to think of a similar research being 
conducted in the future wherein past instead of present policymakers would be 
interviewed. Given that this research heavily relies on policymakers’ perspectives within 
the last 6 years, the passage of time might prove worthwhile to conduct another project. 
If such project comes to fruition,  previous policymakers might have changed their 
perspectives owing to the fact that any pressure on their professional capacities back 
then, have long abated by the time such future research is undertaken whenever that 
might be.     
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